GO, the ancient Chinese strategy game, looks a lot like Othello, with its grid board and black and white pieces. Othello is really nothing like GO and has nothing to do with the points I am leading to, but I mention it to serve as a starting visual for any potential non-Chinese or non-GO-playing readers. The goal in GO is to place your pieces strategically to control space on the board. As it is a two-person game, and as both players have the same goal—to acquire as much real estate on the board as possible—winning necessitates a strong defense and a still stronger offense.

GO demonstrates very visually the importance of strong offense in a struggle for power. There’s a word for it in the game – sente. To have sente means that you are the player who is being responded to. Your moves are strong enough that your opponent has to respond defensively, and while your opponent is responding you are thinking of the next move that they will also have to respond to. Sometimes a player will maintain sente for pretty much the whole game… if her opponent really sucks at GO.

It’s not a fixed equation, but the player who has sente for more turns in the game is most likely going to be the winner of the game. So while the goal is to control space, if a player has a choice between using her turn to fortify the barrier around her claimed territory and invading contested space, she needs to consider sente. If she can force her opponent to move defensively, she will likely have opportunity to secure that border later on, and by then her border may surround much more space.

Why am I rambling about a board game? Well, honestly, I had intended this as an aside for a very different post, but now here I am so I’m gonna roll with it – because GO isn’t just any board game. Anyone who knows of my high school obsession with Monopoly (yes, I played two different four-month seasons in a Monopoly League) knows how I can get into games. But GO is different… really, yes, I’m serious. I love GO because it teaches me a lot about power and political struggle. It gives very helpful visuals for all sorts of real-life situations, especially in the context of political struggle. You can see clearly, for example, how a lone fighter (a single black or white piece) who ventures too far into enemy territory (the other color pieces) and too far from his base or his backup (nearby pieces of the same color), is very likely doomed as an individual piece. It shows how a direct attack is often not the best option.

Most importantly though, it teaches you how to concentrate your energy into the places where you are winning—where you have momentum—to maintain sente, to set the agenda and, when you are losing, to quickly cut your losses, to only put resources into fortifying a border you can defend, and to move on to regain sente.

In short, GO helps you think like a winner, to look for the places where you can win, and to know and let go of the places where winning is unlikely.

Power struggles involve real people, real relationships, and, more often than not, real suffering and consequences. Thinking in the way described above can be brutal. The sick term “collateral damage” comes to mind. It’s not surprising then that GO—I’ve heard a rumor, but cannot confirm as true—is big on Wall St. and within the so-called U.S. intelligence agencies.

But don’t get me wrong. You Lefties should still play GO. Really. We can’t let our opponents have a monopoly on strategy. (Just because Karl Rove uses deodorant doesn’t mean you shouldn’t!)

I often feel like many in the Left in this country see the whole “board” as our opponent’s territory, that we tend to see every institution—from local government to national labor unions to churches to the Democratic Party—as filled exclusively with our opponents’ “pieces.” And we try to fight it all, all at once, all the time, always defensively. We feel overwhelmed by the pervasiveness of injustice in our society—understandably so, dammit—and we want to stand against all of it.

Well, that’s a healthy, humane impulse.

But we need to focus our energy to where we are likely to gain some momentum, to where we can make our opponents respond to our agenda, to where we are most likely to gain some ground.

Here’s what Michael McPhearson, Executive Director of Veterans For Peace, has to say:

I think about it in terms of what I call the initiative. Let’s say you’re watching boxing, and at the beginning of the fight they’re sort of feeling each other out. If it’s you and me, and all of a sudden I get a punch in and stagger you, from now on—after that punch—up until you get yourself back together, you’re reacting. I have the initiative. Once you get yourself back together, neither one of us might have the initiative, or you might strike me and then you have it. In 2005, Cindy Sheehan’s Camp Casey created a space where the antiwar movement gained the initiative on the Bush administration and the pro-war forces. And we kept that initiative all the way through to the midterm elections the following year. We lost it as we tried to make the new Congress respond to us. And now no one has it.

People are still looking for an answer. While we can’t control what happens in Iraq—and that can change the political environment here—we do have an opportunity to regain initiative, before events in Iraq or actions by the pro-war forces here gain it for them. We have to think about how we’re going to do that.

This quote is from when I interviewed Michael for the War Resister’s League’s Listening Process. I didn’t ask him about GO. I asked him to assess constraints and openings for antiwar organizing in the United States today.

A sad sidenote: out of the many many such interviews that WRL did with organizers from across the country, his is the only one where the recording device tragically malfunctioned, and we lost one of the most brilliant 20-minute monologues I’ve ever heard. Fortunately we didn’t lose everything. The above quote is in the report, but I remember him having a lot more to say on this concept of initiative (aka sente), and I’m going to try to get around to reviewing more of his interview and asking his permission to publish more of it.

In conclusion: I have a GO board that I often have with me. I actually brought it along to North Carolina where I’m “deployed” for the next 2+ weeks, on the off-chance that I may encounter someone who plays. Please, reader, learn or already know how to play GO and then please be around on one of the rare occasions when I have time to play. That’s my main point here, I think.

Disclaimers: I’m a pretty mediocre GO player. And none of these ideas are remotely original. Read Sun Tzu.

P.S. Another unconfirmed rumor: according to the CIA’s files, Mao Zedong’s victory over Chiang Kai-shek had something to do with Mao’s GO-based strategy proving superior to Chiang Kai-shek’s CIA-provided, Chess-based strategy. (I hope I’m not offending any Chess enthusiasts here.)

P.P.S. Credit where credit is due: All GO-related unconfirmed rumors are my probably bastardized versions of stuff I heard a long time ago from the person who taught me GO, Patrick Reinsborough. Patrick is a dedicated and very quotable organizer, as anyone who reads WRL’s full Listening Process report will pick up on. Patrick is co-founder of the smartMeme Strategy & Training Project, which you should check out – and not just because they feature GO on some of their promo materials.

Published on Thursday, June 26, 2008 on CommonDreams.org

Remember February 15, 2003?

That day saw the largest coordinated global demonstrations in the history of the world. Ten million people from more than 60 countries sent a clear message to Washington that the world was saying no to a U.S. war against Iraq. The newest manifestation of the antiwar movement seemed finally ahead of the game. But when the Bush Administration ignored us, what were we to do next? This was no easy question, and organizers understandably struggled with direction, tactics and strategy.

Five years on, we have some assessing to do. Despite the dedication of many, our successes have been quite limited. We have been unable to translate popular antiwar sentiment into popular antiwar action. We have been unable to build the kind of grassroots political power strong enough to apply pressure to end the occupation.

Over the past several months, as part of an organizational assessment project initiated by the War Resisters League, I’ve had the opportunity to speak to 90 grassroots organizers and activists from across the country. Many of them work explicitly on issues of war and peace, while others focus on other issues, including labor, economic justice, gender justice, racial justice and the environment. We asked them about the biggest constraints they face in building a stronger and more effective peace movement and how it can become a more diverse, cross-class and multiracial peace movement.

War Resisters League’s Listening Process
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What we found was that a cross-section of organizers from diverse groups across the country — local efforts like the Port Militarization Resistance in the northwest; constituency-based organizations like U.S. Labor Against the War, Veterans for Peace and the Women of Color Resource Center; and national coalitions like United for Peace & Justice — are grappling with similar issues related to demographics, cultural constraints, strategy and capacity.

The movement has a demographic problem and an image problem (and they’re related).

Military members represent a diversity in society that movement people often don’t. And I’ve always had that struggle as a former military person myself, that I’ve been in rooms where I look at everyone and I think, ‘You guys freak me out. I can’t relate to where you’re coming from.’

– Aimee Allison, veteran and coauthor of Army of None.

Widespread opinion against the war does not equal a large-scale identification with a peace or antiwar movement. Some organizers even disputed the use of the term antiwar “movement,” questioning whether we have a solid enough base of people taking collective action to even constitute a movement.

Many of the people I spoke to sensed that a majority of Americans — and particularly working-class people and communities of color — felt alienated from the white, counterculture image of the peace/antiwar movement.

Some of the problem lies with how the media broadcasts the narrative of “hippies” and “the sixties” and makes “activists” and “protesters” an alien identity — as opposed to portraying activism and protest as actions reasonable people take when they’re fed up. At most antiwar demonstrations, however, there’s no short supply of folks providing images and sound bites that enable the media to run with this angle.

Some organizers suggested that we are so used to holding a minority position, that we have become emotionally attached to a marginalized identity. We have to breathe in the new political climate, realize that some of our positions are now popular, start connecting with more people, and re-imagine ourselves as winners.

We need to focus less on big demonstrations, and more on organizing a base and building leadership.

I think that a big obstacle to the antiwar movement building stronger, longer-term institutions is the politics of the philanthropy community. So much of movement infrastructure has been professionalized and is anchored by nonprofits in this country — some quite effectively, some quite destructively. The antiwar movement lacks access to the millions of dollars of philanthropy money going into different social change ventures. That limits the antiwar movement’s ability to create the kind of basic infrastructure and organizing that would help turn popular antiwar sentiment into action.

– Patrick Reinsborough, smartMeme Strategy & Training Project

As a trend, organizers felt weary of mass rallies and marches in this political moment. No one in power seems to be listening, and national demonstrations seem to get less and less media coverage. A number of people pointed out that local demonstrations and other forms of local action often get more bang for the buck with media.

In addition, large rallies are resource-intensive, and the antiwar movement has a shortage of money, staff, infrastructure and leadership. Some organizers noted how the peace movement, in comparison to the labor movement, the environmental movement, and community organizing efforts, has fewer jobs and resources.

As social movements have institutionalized largely as nonprofits over the past decades, this lack of “peace jobs” is no small factor for the peace movement. One organizer described how he got involved in activism through issues of war and peace, but as he acquired the skills to stick with organizing for the long haul, he went to work with an environmental organization because that’s where the organizing jobs were.

As a result of this and other related resource factors, some classic models of organizing widely used in the labor movement — like identifying a target constituency, organizing some of them into a membership base, and developing the leadership of some members to continue to build an organization and base — are known or practiced by few in the peace movement. Many interviewees encouraged national organizations to focus more on supporting the leadership and skills development of local organizers and groups.

The growing GI movement is likely to play a critical role in ending the war.

The majority of the military is working class, and there are connections there that we have not capitalized on. I think that even the construction worker with the American flag sticking on his helmet probably has a pretty negative opinion of the war and probably knows somebody who got fucked up over there. If the Longshoremen received a phone call from Iraq Veterans Against the War saying, ‘We’d like to talk to you guys about possible action,’ we would probably get a response, out of respect for the veteran part of it. I think the opportunity is almost ripe for the picking, and that’s probably the next step.

– Jose Vasquez, Iraq Veterans Against the War (IVAW), NYC Chapter President

We interviewed members of IVAW, Veterans for Peace, Service Women’s Action Network and other organizers who are military veterans. We also asked all of our interviewees about the role of soldiers, veterans and their families in ending the war, and also how others can best support their efforts. Most everyone we talked with felt that soldiers, vets and their families are uniquely positioned to organize in ways that others sometimes cannot, particularly in organizing active-duty GIs.

For a number of reasons, some problematic, they are also seen as some of the most credible critics of the war, and our interviewees unanimously saw them as effective spokespeople. Some folks viewed them primarily as spokespeople, while the veterans we interviewed were more excited about organizing other soldiers and vets. Because they are seen by many in the peace/antiwar movement primarily as spokespeople rather than organizers, people often viewed support as having them speak at an event or be at the front of a march.

Veterans’ groups tended to describe support more practically; lending a hand with logistics, raising money, and the like. Some veterans saw themselves as particularly well positioned to connect with working class constituencies, and help build a broad-based movement.

For example, IVAW is crossing a critical threshold, moving from what has for a long time functioned essentially as a speakers’ bureau of antiwar vets into a chapter-building organization with skilled organizers who are increasingly focused on active duty soldiers.

• • •

While it’s easy to be critical of the current peace/antiwar movement, it is important to point out that a lot of its leadership shares these critiques but often lacks the capacity to correct the problems. It’s also important to recognize that some of the most critical organizing work is not made for television, but is the unglamorous jobs of developing leadership and building relationships and a base. We need more organizing — enough of it to leverage political power — but let’s start by amplifying what’s already happening, rather than starting from scratch.

To read the full WRL Listening Process report, visit http://warresisters.org/listeningprocess

Matthew Smucker is the national field organizer for War Resisters League and coordinates WRL’s GI resistance support work.

Published in WIN Magazine Winter 2008 Issue

Since coming on board with the War Resisters League last April, I’ve been meeting with peace and justice organizers across the country, hearing about what’s working, what’s not, and what’s needed at the local level. One of the assessment questions I’ve been asking folks is about the role of antiwar veterans and soldiers in the peace movement.

Responses have varied but there seems to be broad agreement that, while we need many voices from diverse backgrounds speaking out against war, still, veterans and soldiers deserve a special place. War impacts them more than anyone else inside the US. Furthermore, antiwar soldiers and vets are positioned to play a unique and powerful role in ending the Iraq War, in preventing a war against Iran, and in challenging a culture of militarism. The success of their organizing efforts is crucial to the success of the broader antiwar movement.

So, are we doing what we can to support their success? What do they need? Do they have enough money and resources to operate at full capacity? What else do we have to offer?

We’ve been asking ourselves and other folks in the peace movement these questions, and reflecting more specifically on support roles the WRL might play – as well as the historic role of GIs within the War Resisters League. We’re having this conversation in the context of a deepening relationship with Iraq Veterans Against the War (IVAW). This spring the IVAW NYC chapter moved into a section of our national office. They set up shop shortly after I came on as field organizer. At the time Steve Theberge (WRL Organizing Coordinator) was working with them on planning for Operation First Casualty (OFC), in which IVAW members dressed in their fatigues and re-enacted scenes from the Iraq War in the streets of New York. Steve coordinated the “civilian actors” for OFC, and pulled me in to help with some of the media outreach. We were both deeply moved by the experience. Since then we’ve been able to collaborate with IVAW on a few projects including workshops at the US Social Forum, a meeting of NYC IVAW members and allies, and a weekend strategy and skills retreat.

IVAW started in July of 2004 with seven founding members, and now, two and a half years later, their numbers have grown to over 700 members and 30 chapters. IVAW is made up of people who have been (and some who currently are in) any branch of the service during the “war on terror.” Their strategy is to pressure an end to the Iraq War by organizing military dissent and weakening military support for the war. They are at an exciting stage in the development of their organization, with an increasing number of members becoming skilled organizers.

I am excited about what additional support for antiwar soldiers and vets could look like in the current political context. However, part of me is cautious. My misgivings are not a question of whether they deserve support, but rather of whether well-intended support could ever be a liability. I think the key is for supporters to find ways to stand with vets and soldiers without standing in the camera shot, and without trying to run the show. At Operation First Casualty the supporters spent a day together before the action, training to play a support role that drew the attention not to themselves, but to the vets. It was a good example of supporters playing less visible but very appreciated roles, and taking direction from the vets.

My interactions with IVAW members these past months have tremendously shifted the way I think about soldiers and vets in relation to antiwar organizing. I used to, without realizing it, think of antiwar soldiers mostly as insiders who became defectors, thankfully bolstering the antiwar movement’s positions. While there is some truth to this, there are also much deeper layers. When I listen to an antiwar soldier or vet speak about their experiences, my ideological frameworks seem distant and abstract. I find myself deeply moved, fully captivated by their powerful stories. I start to see them as the primary community impacted by war (within the US); a community struggling for peace and justice on behalf of others, but also on its own behalf, for its own rights, dignity and liberation. War has affected more than their opinions. Many, many vets return home injured or traumatized by their experiences. CBS recently reported (November 13, 2007) that in 2005 at least 6256 US veterans committed suicide, averaging 17 per day. IVAW is working to end the Iraq War, but also to meet real needs of its membership. I used to think supporting IVAW meant arranging for a member to speak at a rally. But clearly meaningful support has to go deeper.

As this ugly war drags on, IVAW’s numbers continue to grow, as well as their capacity. They are currently organizing for Winter Soldier, where soldiers who served in Iraq and Afghanistan will testify about their experiences to show that, “the problem goes much deeper than the atrocities of Abu Ghraib or the massacre in Haditha,” and that, “responsibility belongs to those in the seat of power.” Let’s ask how we can support them.